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Non-Technical Summary 
 
It is a common belief that more information about climate change will lead to a better under-
standing of the phenomenon and to an increase of prevention measures, such as insurance for 
natural hazards. 
To test this hypothesis, two independent surveys in Germany were conducted. The survey by 
the research team of KIT was based on an internet questionnaire and a sample of 510 re-
spondents from all regions and socio-economic groups in Germany. The other survey (by re-
searchers of ZEW) was conducted with 157 respondents which were personally present at the 
premises of the research institute in Mannheim. 
The main objective of the analyses was to check the correlations and interactions between 
knowledge about climate change, scientific information about the phenomenon and the risk 
perception of climate-induced hazards. Furthermore the links between risk perception and 
prevention measures were analysed. 
We found that respondents who revealed a better actual knowledge in questions about climate 
change perceived climate change impacts as less hazardous than those with weaker 
knowledge. The impact of actual knowledge is opposed to the effect of the self-declared 
knowledge of the respondents. Respondents who declared their own level of information 
about climate change as being rather high showed a higher degree of risk perception of cli-
mate change than those who ascribed themselves a lower level of information. 
Overall, in both surveys independently from each other we identified certain factors determin-
ing risk perception. These are: gender (female respondents exhibited higher risk perception), 
experience of damages through extreme weather events (experience implies higher risk per-
ception), and actual knowledge about climate change (better knowledge implies lower risk 
perception). Surprisingly, the provision of scientific information about expected climate 
change impacts showed no significant effect on the risk perception. 
Furthermore we found a positive effect of risk perception of climate change on the willing-
ness to insure and a significant influence of experience with damages through extreme weath-
er events on insurance coverage.   
Since information about the consequences of climate change does not lead to increased risk 
perception, we doubt the efficiency of large-scale public information campaigns. Given the 
broad coverage of the topic in mass media with partly quite drastic pictures and messages, 
scientifically grounded information may not enhance the awareness that climate change can 
impact everybody and that it is time to take action on a personal level. 
   
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Es ist eine weit verbreitete Ansicht, dass mehr Informationen über den Klimawandel zu einem 
besseren Verständnis des Phänomens und zu einem Anstieg von Präventionsmaßnahmen, wie dem 
Abschluss von Versicherungen gegen Naturgefahren, führen.  
Um diese Thematik zu untersuchen wurden zwei unabhängige Erhebungen durchgeführt. Die 
Umfrage der Forschungsgruppe des KIT basierte auf einem Online- Fragebogen mit 510 Teil-
nehmern aller sozio-ökonomischer Gruppierungen und aus allen Regionen Deutschlands. Die 
andere Umfrage (von Wissenschaftlern des ZEW) wurde mit 157 Teilnehmern durchgeführt, die 
in den Räumlichkeiten des Forschungsinstituts in Mannheim persönlich anwesend waren.  
Das Ziel der Analysen war es, die Zusammenhänge und Wechselwirkungen zwischen dem Wis-
sen über den Klimawandel, wissenschaftlicher Information über das Phänomen, sowie der Risi-
kowahrnehmung bezüglich klimabedingter Gefahren zu überprüfen. Außerdem wurden die Bezie-
hungen von Risikowahrnehmung und Präventionsmaßnahmen untersucht. 
Teilnehmer, die ein besseres Wissen in Fragen des Klimawandels offenbaren, schätzen die Effekte 
des Klimawandels als weniger gefährlich ein als solche mit niedrigerem Wissensstand. Der Ein-
fluss von tatsächlichem Wissen verhält sich gegenteilig zu dem des selbst deklarierten Wissens. 
Die Teilnehmer, die ihr eigenes Informationsniveau über den Klimawandel relativ hoch einschät-
zen, zeigen ein höheres Maß an Risikowahrnehmung des Klimawandels als diejenigen, die sich 
selbst einen niedrigeren Informationsstand zuschreiben. 
Insgesamt wurden in beiden Befragungen unabhängig voneinander bestimmte Faktoren identifi-
ziert, die die Risikowahrnehmung beeinflussen. Diese sind: das Geschlecht (weibliche Befragte 
zeigen eine höhere Risikowahrnehmung), Erfahrungen mit extremen Wetterereignissen (Scha-
denerfahrung bedeutet eine höhere Risikowahrnehmung), und das tatsächliche Wissen über den 
Klimawandel (besseres Wissen impliziert eine niedrigere Risikowahrnehmung). Überraschender-
weise zeigt die Bereitstellung von wissenschaftlichen Informationen über die erwarteten Klimaef-
fekte keinen signifikanten Effekt auf die Risikowahrnehmung.  
Außerdem wurden ein positiver Effekt der Risikowahrnehmung des Klimawandels auf die Bereit-
schaft sich zu versichern und ein signifikanter Einfluss der Erfahrung mit Schäden durch extreme 
Wetterereignisse auf den Versicherungsschutz gefunden. 
Da Informationen über die Folgen des Klimawandels nicht zu einer steigenden Risikowahrneh-
mung führen, sind Zweifel über die Effizienz groß angelegter öffentlicher Informationskampag-
nen angebracht. Angesichts der breiten Berichterstattung über das Thema in den Massenmedien, 
mit teilweise recht drastischen Bildern und Nachrichten, können wissenschaftlich fundierte In-
formationen das Bewusstsein, dass der Klimawandel persönlich spürbare Auswirkungen haben 
wird und dass es Zeit zum Handeln ist, vermutlich nicht steigern. 
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Abstract 
 
In two empirical surveys in Germany the link between the information respondents have 
about climate change and their risk perception of the phenomenon was analysed. We found 
that a better understanding of the effects of climate change might lead to a decrease of the 
perceived hazard. In contrast, a high self-declared knowledge about climate change might 
correspond with higher risk perception. Further factors affecting the risk perception of climate 
change are gender, experience of extreme weather events and trust in external aid. Surprising-
ly, information campaigns based on scientific facts are not effective for increasing risk per-
ception and willingness to insure. Higher risk perception might induce higher interest in pre-
cautionary measures like insurance.   
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Introduction 
Climate change is the triggering mechanism for a variety of changes, but it cannot be experi-
enced in itself. The consequences triggered by climate change happen very slowly and can 
only be determined through statistical analysis of temperature and precipitation data, and 
by continuous monitoring of their variations and the effects induced on the natural envi-
ronment such as extreme weather events. These observations and analyses have to take a 
long view, therefore generating long-term predictions. Consequently, the derived, effects of 
climate change lie further in the future than the planning horizon of most individuals reach-
es.2 
All these factors create an image of climate change as a phenomenon in which most people 
can believe or not since they mainly must rely on scientific models, expert judgments, and 
media reports.3 Personal experiences with potential effects of climate change, e.g. longer 
drought periods for farmers or more frequent flooding of homes, are rare.4 Therefore it can 
be assumed that the majority of people rate the risk of climate change on an abstract, cogni-
tive level which might lead to an underestimation of the hazards of climate change.5 Then 
again, the term ‘risk’ is generally understood as describing the possible downside of activi-
ties or events resulting in damages, and not so much potential positive effects. This is also 
the focus of our article. However, when judging risks, people might mentally counterbalance 
expected positive and negative effects of risks. These mental processes and the underlying 
differing interpretations of risk or are not covered in this article. 
We concentrate on analysing the existing knowledge about climate change in two samples of 
the German population, the role of knowledge and scientific information for risk perception, 
and the resulting willingness to insure against extreme weather events. Furthermore, we 
analyse the influence of other factors on the perception of climate change, like socio-
demographic characteristics, or the respondent’s own judgement regarding their knowledge, 
as well as the effect of trust in external aid, science and technology, and personal experienc-
es with extreme weather events. 
It turns out that the actual knowledge about climate change corresponds to the knowledge 
level declared by the respondents. However, the correlation between the two is rather 
weak. Many people tend to overestimate the expected climate impacts in terms of key pa-
rameters, such as temperature increase or sea level rise. Regarding the personal risk percep-
tion, especially those individuals reveal a high perceived risk who (a) ascribe high damage 
potential to climate change, (b) expect little aid from external sources, and (c) see climate 
change as something new and unexplored. The factors a to c in turn are related to gender, 
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age, and experience with extreme weather events, and self-perceived and actual knowledge 
about climate change. Another interesting finding is that scientific information on expected 
climate impacts does not increase the risk perceived, possibly due to a “relaxation effect” in 
the group as expectations based on prior knowledge are more severe. Regarding the relation 
of risk perception and willingness to insure, the findings are more ambiguous. There seems 
to be a positive correlation between the extent of risk perceived and existing or intended 
insurance for extreme weather events but the effect in our samples is relatively weak. 
1. Methodology of the surveys 
The relations of/between actual and declared knowledge about climate change, perceived 
risk, and willingness to purchase natural hazard insurance have been analyzed by two sur-
veys, which were developed and conducted independently by two different research teams. 
Even though the foci of the research groups were slightly different, it turns out that the sur-
veys developed are complementary and compatible in the sense that both of them cover the 
abovementioned aspects and – if presented in connection – allow deeper insights into the 
complex of perceived risk and related topics. 
The first study is called “study A” in this paper. It was based on an online-survey, which was 
conducted in Germany among 510 participants. The participants were selected according to 
layered quotas based on the distribution of gender, age and education level in the German 
population. Regarding these characteristics, the sample was representative although we 
made sure to include a certain minimum number of participants from 2 federal states with 
political conditions that might be important for the willingness to insure. Nevertheless, peo-
ple from all federal states took part in this survey in March 2010.  
The main part of the survey consisted of questions regarding the perception of the climate 
change risk, following the psychometric paradigm6: Traditional attributes used for the rating 
of activities, technologies or events regarding their risk were supplemented by research-
specific characteristics. Furthermore, the respondents were questioned about their own 
experiences with extreme weather events, and their general knowledge about climate 
change issues was assessed (c.f. Appendix A1). We also asked for the sources of information 
used to learn about climate change, and for precautionary measures that could be taken on 
a personal basis. Finally, several insurance products with varying design options for weather-
related risks were presented. Here, the respondents could indicate their willingness to buy 
as well as payment and prize preferences. 
The second study, hereinafter called “study B”, is based upon a smaller sample than study A, 
with 157 participants. It was conducted in February 2010. The main difference to study A is 
that the participants of study B were divided into two treatment groups. While one group of 
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104 participants received an informative text about the scientific background of climate 
change and expected climate impacts, the control group of 53 individuals received no addi-
tional information.7 The selection of treatment groups was random. The provided informa-
tive input had been gathered from mainstream literature sources such as IPCC (2007) (as 
source for the scientific background and more global impacts) and national studies8, as 
sources for more local impacts. It was presented in the form of a two-page text in simple, 
easily understandable language which is attached in the Appendix B1. In order to assure that 
the text was really read, all participants had to be personally present in a facility of the re-
search institute. The questionnaire about risk and insurance was distributed not before all 
participants have had enough time to thoroughly study the texts provided.  
All participants came from the city of Mannheim in South West Germany, in the Upper Rhine 
Valley. The city has not been affected by major storm or flood events in recent years, but its 
geographical position and its building density makes it vulnerable to urban heat waves. Alt-
hough all employment statuses and many professions were represented, the socio-economic 
structure of our sample is not assured to represent total Germany. However, these circum-
stances are not expected to systematically bias the results of the research questions in this 
paper. In particular, most statistical analyses are actually intra-sample comparisons. E.g., the 
absolute value of personal risk perception does not play a role, but rather its intra-sample 
variation and the dependence of the variation on other variables. We do not expect that 
these interdependencies vary considerably between different regions within Germany. Be-
sides, all presented results of study B which have a counterpart in the representative study A 
show a convincing consistence with results from study A. 
The questionnaire itself was divided into two parts. First, general socio-economic variables 
were asked, followed by a short series of knowledge questions about personal estimates of 
key climate change parameters. After this first part, a share of the sample was provided with 
the abovementioned informative text about climate change. The second part of the ques-
tionnaire elicited the personal perceived risk by a series of 17 statements about the rele-
vance and hazard of climate change and the respective levels of agreement of respondents 
with these statements (c.f. Appendix B2). Preferences regarding insurance coverage were 
also asked in this second part of the questionnaire. 
2. Declared and actual knowledge about climate change  
Respondents of the internet-based online-study A were asked “How well are you informed 
about the topic of climate change?” The answer was given on a scale ranging from “I am not 
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mation about expected local climate impacts in South West Germany, and another group which received only 
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do not play a role in respect to the research questions posed in this paper. For the present analysis, both 
aforementioned groups are treated as one.  
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at all informed” to “I am excellently informed”. The result of this question is listed in Figure 
1, left panel. The majority of the respondents (67%) declared being rather well informed 
(values 6 or higher). Only 22% indicated a level of information below 5.  
But how much do the respondents really know about climate change? To find out, 8 multiple 
choice questions were provided. These questions and appropriate answers to them were 
checked beforehand by experts in the topic of climate change. Likewise, the comprehensibi-
ty of the questionnaire had been pretested several times with students and other persons. 
To prevent cheating, e.g. with online-searches for the correct answers, a time limit of 45 
seconds per answer was set. Knowledge about climate change was measured by a score that 
increased with correct answers and was reduced by wrong answers. The option “I don’t 
know” had no effect on the score. The possible range of the overall score runs from -8 to +8. 
Both extremes were never reached, as can be seen in Figure 1, right panel. All questions and 
the multiple choice options are listed in Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. in 
the appendix A1. The relative frequency of the options chosen is listed in parentheses; cor-
rect answers are printed in bold. The majority of respondents obtained close to zero points 
over all. 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Study A - declared (left panel) versus actual knowledge (right panel) about cli-
mate change  
 
The correlation between the individually declared level of information and the score ob-
tained in the knowledge questionnaire is very weak, but significant and positive. Those who 
ascribed a better knowledge to themselves, actually knew slightly more facts about climate 
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change (Pearsons-r = 0,11**).9 The weakness of this correlation however fits well with find-
ings regarding a knowledge illusion, which means that people tend to overestimate their 
knowledge of topics that are broadly discussed in the media.10 Therefore, the declared 
knowledge level of respondents is not necessarily a suitable indicator of their actual 
knowledge.  
The pattern of relatively little knowledge about climate science is also shown by results of 
study B. Here participants were asked in an open-ended question about their estimation of 
the expected global temperature increase and the expected sea level rise within one decade. 
Although the “correct” answer depends on the exact decade (e.g. the correct values differ 
between the 1990s and the 2090s) the question was posed in this general form in order to 
keep it short and simple for the participants. All answers which range broadly in the uncer-
tainty ranges of the IPCC (2007) were coded as “correct”. Although these uncertainty ranges 
are quite high, the share of correct answers is relatively low, and almost every incorrect an-
swer is indicating values with too high estimations. The survey also shows that people do not 
dare a guess (don’t know answers) (see Table 1). This result indicates that most respondents 
are very pessimistic or quite unsure about concrete climate impacts.  
 
 Underestimation of 
impacts including 
statements of “no im-
pact” and decrease 
Value given by 
climate science 
(IPCC 2007a) 
Overestimation 
of impacts 
Don’t 
know-
answers 
Sea level rise 
in 10 years 
decrease, no change 
and increase up to 13 
mm 
increase between 
13 mm and 38 mm 
increase by more 
than 38 mm 
 
Share of re-
sponses (%) 
12.9 18.1 46.4 22.6 
Global tem-
perature 
change in 10 
years 
decrease, no change 
and increase up to 
0.04°C  
increase between 
0.04°C and 0.16°C 
increase by more 
than 0.16°C 
 
Share of re-
sponses (%) 
5.8 1.9 82.6 9.7 
Table 1: Study B - Respondents’ estimations of key climate impact parameters. 
Although these data stem from a regional survey it is quite plausible that great parts of the 
German public cannot indicate the correct magnitude of meteorological changes induced by 
climate change and – when asked – tend to overestimate them. This phenomenon deserves 
definitely a deeper analysis in future, e.g. about the sources of information and the socio-
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economic background of respondent groups. Here we just want to highlight that the majori-
ty of people in Germany tend to overestimate their knowledge about climate change as well 
as the magnitude of climate effects in Germany. 
 
3. Risk perception of climate change 
In study A, in order to elicit the risk perception of climate change in a way comparable to 
other psychometric research, the respondents were asked to evaluate 8 different risks re-
garding their hazard potential for Germany as a whole and for them personally. The risks 
selected were: driving by car, smoking, floods, storms, flying by plane, crime, nuclear power 
and climate change. Aside from climate change, all risks mentioned had been tested before 
in psychometric research carried out in many countries, including Germany. The main drivers 
for their evaluation as more or less risky are, therefore, rather well known and include the 
kind of risk as technological or natural, familiar or novel, controllable or not, taken voluntari-
ly or imposed, with consequences that are hard or easy to imagine.11 To assess the relative 
positioning of climate change risk, all 8 risks selected were presented to the respondents in 
random order and simultaneously. Therefore, the respondents rated the hazard of each ac-
tivity or event with regard to all other risks. The perceived extent of hazard could be indicat-
ed by movable sliders provided by the online questionnaire. The position of the sliders was 
translated into values from 1 to 10, with 1 meaning “not hazardous at all” and 10 standing 
for “very hazardous”. 
One result was a ranking of the 8 risks according to the average hazard degree attributed to 
them for personal matters. Since the hazard degree estimates for the whole country are 
quite similar, it can be assumed that people are not really able to differentiate between the-
se 2 levels of exposure. The assessments of all 510 respondents regarding their personal 
hazard are shown in Figure 2. Climate Change ranks at about the same level as storms, 
floods, and nuclear power.  
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Figure 2: Study A - Perceived hazard of several risks 
 
In study B, the perceived personal risk of respondents was elicited by a series of 17 state-
ments about the relevance and hazardousness of climate change (c.f. Appendix B2). Based 
on the respective levels of agreement with the statements provided, an index for personal 
perceived risk (PPR) for each individual was constructed. Since the preset scale values range 
between 1 and 5 and are added up for each person, the individual PPR values may range 
between a minimum of 17 and a maximum of 85. The distribution of the PPR index is illus-
trated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Study B - Histogram of PPR index of respondents 
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4. Factors influencing the risk perception of climate change 
In a further step we searched for the underlying factors that influence the perception of the 
hazard of climate change. Therefore, in study A we presented a series of 13 statements 
which were based on the psychometric paradigm12, but also on works about trust13 and per-
ceived adaptive capacity as relevant factors for risk perception, risk attitude and risk behav-
ior.14. The statements are listed in Table 2; they comprised risk attributes like threat, famili-
arity to science and to the exposed, as well as descriptions of potential risk consequences 
such as damages and expected benefits due to climate change, just as outlined in early psy-
chometric research. This was completed by statements referring to individual and public 
means of adaptation and mitigation. Two statements dealt with trust in external help since 
there is evidence to suggest that this might diminish the willingness to prepare on a personal 
level. One statement focussed on the ease or difficulty to imagine the consequences of cli-
mate change. In order to assist the respondents in keeping this risk in mind we addressed it 
explicitly in each statement. From the beginning of this part of the questionnaire it was 
made clear, that all statements referred to the German situation. 
The 13 statements were evaluated by the respondents on scales from 1 to 10, according to 
their level of agreement. These statements were afterwards condensed by a principal com-
ponent analysis. We found four components influencing the risk perception of climate 
change. Those components are shaded in Table 2 and comprise: the perceived degree of 
dread of climate change, the degree of trust in external aid – firefighters and other helpers 
as well as financial support -, the perceived potential to cope with the effects of climate 
change, and the degree to which the risk seems to be familiar. These four components ex-
plain 60.4% of the variance of the underlying variables, which can be taken from the rotated 
component matrix given in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
12
  Slovic (1992), Brun (1992), Karger and Wiedemann (1998), Plapp (2004) 
13
  Slovic (1993); for a thorough literature review see Earle et al. (2007) 
14
  Grothmann and Patt (2005), Goersch (2010). 
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Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Component 
1 
dread 
2 
trust in 
external 
aid 
3  
coping 
capacity 
4  
familiarity,  
Q7 Are you afraid of the possible consequences of climate change? ,836 ,017 -,029 ,052 
Q8 Do you think that damages caused by extreme storms, heat, 
heavy rain, hail or flooding will increase? 
,806 -,052 -,206 ,132 
Q9 Do you think it is likely that climate change will cause natural 
disasters in Germany with many casualties? 
,838 -,092 ,012 ,061 
Q10 To what extent do you think climate change is explored by 
science? 
,095 -,031 ,358 ,493 
Q11 Have you been aware of  the predicted consequences of cli-
mate change for yourself for a long time or is this completely new 
to you? 
,042 ,005 -,252 ,811 
Q12 How well can you picture these consequences of climate 
change? 
,385 ,104 ,023 ,677 
Q13 How large is the benefit you expect for yourself due to cli-
mate change? 
-,116 ,139 ,646 -,260 
Q14 How large is the contribution of man to climate change? ,563 -,209 -,032 ,190 
Q15 Due to technical progress, it will be possible to limit climate 
change and to adapt to its consequences 
-,170 ,409 ,505 -,043 
Q16 In the case of weather-induced disasters, those impacted will 
be assisted quickly by firefighters, civil defense, police and similar 
institutions. 
-,118 ,870 ,071 ,014 
Q17 In the case of weather-induced disasters, those impacted will 
quickly  obtain financial aid (private donations, government assis-
tance). 
-,085 ,830 ,198 ,054 
Q18 Up to what extent do you see options for yourself to guard 
against the dangers of climate change? 
,025 ,125 ,785 ,124 
Q19 Up to what extent do you see opportunities to make a contri-
bution to the mitigation of climate change? 
,489 -,202 ,376 ,213 
Extraction method: Principal component analysis 
 Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-Normalisation 
    
Explained variance of all variables by components 1,2,3,4: R2  0,604 
Table 2: Study A – Statements used to assess the factors influencing risk perception of cli-
mate change 
 
53% of the variance of the perceived hazard of climate change can be explained with three 
of these components - the degree of dread, the degree of trust in external aid and the de-
gree to which climate change is familiar to the respondents. Statistically, the factor ‘coping 
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capacity’ shows no significant influence, whereas dread has the strongest influence on the 
level of perceived hazard. Respondents who fear climate change, who think it will cause dis-
asters with many victims and an increasing amount of damages perceive this phenomenon 
as more hazardous than others. Respondents who have high trust that in case of disasters 
the firefighters and other services will help them and that they will get financial aid to cope 
with the aftermath perceive climate change as less hazardous. Respondents who perceive 
the consequences of climate change as an old, familiar problem and who claim to be able to 
imagine the effects of it clearly perceive this risk as more hazardous than others. The influ-
ence of the principal components on the perceived level of hazard was tested in a regression 
analysis. The results can be taken from Table 3. 
 
N = 510 
Double-sided test: 
*** = significant on the 1%-level 
ANOVA 
Dependent variable:  
Perceived hazard of climate change 
Factor 1 – Degree of dread   1.44*** 
Factor 2 – Degree of trust in external aid -0.167*** 
Factor 4 – Degree of familiarity   0.379*** 
Constant   7.29*** 
Goodness of fit: R2 0.53 
Table 3: Study A – Model of the aggregated principal components influencing the per-
ceived hazard of climate change 
 
Two of these three main components influencing the hazard ratings are themselves influ-
enced by other variables. After dividing the sample of Study A into subgroups of respondents 
with common characteristics, analyses of variance were performed with the following re-
sults: People with better actual knowledge about climate change, who reached higher scores 
in the test questions (Appendix A1: Q21_Q28), had smaller values on the dread factor. That 
means: they perceived climate change and its consequences as less dreadful than people 
with a weaker actual knowledge about climate change. For people who already experienced 
damages from extreme weather events, climate change is more dreadful than for people 
without such experiences. Women perceived a significantly higher level of dread than men 
(see Table 4). 
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N=510  Regression coefficient 
Factor 1  
dread of climate 
change Influenced by: 
 
ANOVA 
 
Actual knowledge (score) -0.043 ** 
Experience with extreme 
weather events (yes) 
  0.20 ** 
Gender (male) -0.485*** 
Constant   0.176*** 
Goodness of fit: R2 0.072 
Factor 4  
familiarity of cli-
mate change Influenced by: 
 
ANOVA Age   0.12*** 
Declared knowledge   0.198*** 
Constant -1.734*** 
Goodness of fit: R2 0.161 
*** = significant at the 1%-level, ** = significant at the 5%-level,  
Table 4: Study A – Background Factors influencing the principal components dread and 
familiarity 
 
The component contending the perceived familiarity of the phenomenon is influenced by 
the age of the respondents and by the declared knowledge about climate change. Elder re-
spondents had higher values on this factor. For them, climate change was more familiar and 
they declared a better imagination of its effects than younger persons. People who claimed 
to be well informed about climate change had higher values on this factor as well (see Table 
4). All these links and dependencies are visualized in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Study A - Reinforcing and weakening factors influencing the hazard ratings 
 
In study B the PPR index is used as a dependent variable in a multivariate regression, in or-
der to shed light on socio-economic variables that may have an effect on the perceived cli-
mate risk. Since the PPR index is bound to values between 17 and 85, the use of ordinary 
least squares is not appropriate. Instead, we transform the PPR index to values between 0 
(for the theoretical minimum of 17) and 1 (for the theoretical maximum of 85) and use a 
fractional logit estimator, as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Here the dependent 
variable may range continuously between 0 and 1. The results are displayed in Table 5. 
 
Perception 
of hazard  
Actual knowledge : - better 
                              - weaker 
Declared knowledge: - good 
                                   - weak 
 
Dread 
Age:                         - older 
                              - younger 
 
Familiarity 
Gender:                     - male 
                                - female 
 
Trust  
in external aid 
Event experiences:  - yes  
                                 - no 
Background Factors Principal components    Hazard Ratings 
 
reinforcing 
weakening 
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Fractional Logit 
N = 142 
(standard deviations in parenthesis) 
Double-sided test: 
*** = significant on the 1%-level 
** = significant on the 5%-level 
* = significant on the 10%-level 
Dependent variable:  
Summated score of 
PPR items, standard-
ized to a value be-
tween 0 and 1 
Gender: female 0.2775 ** 
Age 0.0007 
Children 0.0482 
Education - 0.1773 
Income - 0.0797 
Home-owner 0.1967* 
Agreement to statement “Climate change is big-
gest challenge for mankind” 
0.2510** 
Interest for climate change - 0.0179 
Revealed knowledge on climate change - 0.2191 *** 
Feeling influenced by mass media 0.3521 *** 
Experience of climate change impacts 0.3049 *** 
Constant 0.2658 
Goodness of fit: R2 0.3116 
Table 5: Study B - Results of multivariate regression of Personal Perceived Risk. 
The results reveal that some of the potentially influencing factors do not have an effect on 
Personal Perceived Risk in our sample. E.g., age of respondents, whether they have children 
or not, their level of education, income, and interest for the topic of climate change do not 
show a significant influence on the PPR index. Our data however reveal highly significant 
gender effects (positive effect for females), effects of the individual knowledge level (nega-
tive effect of high knowledge level), of experience of climate impacts (positive), and if re-
spondents state that they feel influenced by mass media (positive). The result with regard to 
gender has to be interpreted with caution, though. In study A we found that women per-
ceive all risks higher than men by about 1 point. When we ranked the perceived hazard of all 
risks for each respondent – from flying with an airplane to crime - climate change was on 
average on third place for men and for women alike. 
In study B, results of the analysis of Personal Perceived Risk show a significant influence of 
climate knowledge. Those respondents who gave correct estimates of key climate impact 
parameters tend to exhibit a relatively low personal perceived risk index. The respective 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is -0.3078, at a significance level of 0.001. Also the multivar-
iate regression results, indicated in Table 5 confirm the significant negative effect of 
knowledge level on PPR (significant on the 1%-level).  
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5. External information and risk perception 
The last few years have seen an increasing coverage of the topic of climate change both in 
the mass media as well as in information campaigns from governments or non-governmental 
organisations. Most of the information aims to educate people about the increasing physical 
impacts which are to be expected in the coming decades and about ways to adapt to or cope 
with these impacts. As noted by Etkin and Ho (2007), however, there is still a large discrep-
ancy between the level of information within the scientific community and the general pub-
lic about climate change. Hence, in one way or another, information campaigns seek to in-
crease risk awareness in order to motivate people to act against the causes and conse-
quences of climate change.  
In the previous sections, it was demonstrated, however, that our studies have generated 
somewhat surprising results with respect to the influence of people’s level of knowledge and 
the subsequent level of risk perception. Recalling, study A found that individuals scoring high 
in knowledge questions about climate change had a relatively low feeling of dread about 
climate change, which correlates with low risk perception scores. Similar results were ob-
tained in study B, where participants scoring high on objective knowledge questions scored 
comparably low on the personal risk index.  
As has been stated, the topic of climate change has increasingly gained attention in the last 
years and numerous information campaigns, aiming to increase people’s knowledge about 
the processes and implications of climate change, have been initiated. In the light of findings 
such as in study A and study B, the question about the effectiveness of such information 
campaigns arises. As the provision of information seems to be one central tool to main-
stream knowledge about climate change and adaptation by the general public, study B was 
partly devised in order to test the effect of providing information on people’s personal risk 
perception, i.e. the effectiveness of such campaigns in instigating awareness about the po-
tential threats of climate change. 
In the study, the experimental group received two pages of specific information on the pro-
cess of climate change, its expected physical impacts as well as an overview of mitigation 
and adaptation measures before filling out the questionnaire. The control group received no 
information before completing the questionnaire. The personal risk levels (PPR scores) of 
each participant were measured after the participants had read this information stimulus. 
The (translated) text of the information stimulus may be found in the Appendix B1. 
To test whether the provision of information about climate change can significantly influ-
ence the personal risk perception of individuals, first the difference in mean PPR scores be-
tween the control group and the treatment group was analysed using a Wilcoxon ranked 
sum test. While it was found that the mean PPR scores of the treatment group were slightly 
higher compared to the control group, this difference was not significant at the 10% level. 
Hence, from this analysis it has to be concluded that providing information does in fact not 
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significantly influence people’s personal risk perception towards climate change. The results 
of this analysis can be found in Table 6. 
 
Variable Information 
group 
N Mean* Wilcoxon 
rank sum 
p-value (rejection of H1) 
PPR (as summat-
ed score of PPR 
items)* 
Provision of 
information 
104 60.11 8439.5 
0.4066 
No provision of 
information 
53 58.14 3963.5 
Table 6: Study B - Wilcoxon rank sum test for equality of distributions of PPR in different 
information treatments. H0: Distributions of PPR in both groups are equal – H1: Distribu-
tions of PPR in both groups differ from each other. 
 
Further on, a multivariate analysis using PPR as the dependent variable was carried out fol-
lowing the procedure explained before. The results of this regression analysis are in line with 
the results from the Wilcoxon ranked sum test and also demonstrate a non-significant effect 
of information on individual’s risk perception compared to the control group not receiving 
any information. Therefore, the results of study B lead to the conclusion that the provision 
of scientific information does not reliably influence the level of risk ratings of individuals with 
regard to climate change. 
While the current results challenge the assumption that informing people about the poten-
tial threats of climate change will increase their personal risk perception, they also raise the 
question as to why such information campaigns might not be effective in causing a higher 
level of risk awareness. In order to shed more light on this issue specific research in this area 
is required. However, some general remarks shall be presented as to which processes might 
underlie these findings. 
One reason for the lack of a significant positive effect of information on the perceived level 
of risk might be the relatively low severity of the communicated information. As can be seen 
from the answers to various knowledge items, the participants of study B tended to overes-
timate the expected impacts of climate change and might hence have been rather “disap-
pointed” by the realistic, rather technical information they received. This hypothesis is given 
support by the significant positive effect of “feeling influenced by mass media” on the risk 
perception scores of our participants (see Table 5), as the images and information in the 
media can usually be regarded as rather “dramatic” with regular coverage of extensive 
flooding, dangerous heat waves or life threatening hurricanes. In contrast to the rather 
strong, emotional mental images about climate change that seem to have been evoked with-
in the participants by mass media, the neutral information presented in the current study 
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might thus have led people to rate the risks of climate change as rather manageable and 
thus score comparably low on the risk perception items. 
 
6. Risk perception and insurance 
Even if information campaigns about scientifically proven climate impacts may not yield the 
effect of higher levels of personal perceived risk, the question remains whether perceived 
risk with regard to climate change is relevant for private insurance demand, e.g. for natural 
hazard insurance. This issue may arise because perceived risk may be influenced by other 
measures or events, such as more populist media campaigns or – more important – personal 
experiences of climate-induced extreme weather events. Both effects are plausible when 
looking at the survey data of study B (Table 5). 
Looking at the relationship of perceived risk and insurance demand, the data of both surveys 
yield an ambiguous message. Both surveys raise the topic of natural hazard insurance, how-
ever in different manners. In study A participants were asked whether they have actually 
signed an insurance police (casualty insurance, building insurance, household insurance). In 
study B, in contrast, all participants were asked about their agreement to the statement ”I 
think it is important to purchase insurance for climate induced damages now”, on a five-
point scale from “total agreement” to “total disagreement”. In other words, study A elicits 
the insurance coverage in a revealed preference manner, whereas study B uses stated pref-
erences in order to measure the willingness to insure.  
In study A we separated the respondents into two groups. One group was composed of indi-
viduals who had any kind of home and accident insurance and another group had none of 
the abovementioned insurance products. Then we conducted a logistic regression with both 
groups as dependent variable. It is not surprising that real estate owners had a higher prob-
ability of being insured than respondents who rent their accommodation since this has been 
discovered by former national and international studies, too.15 People who already experi-
enced damages through an extreme weather event in the past also seem to have a higher 
probability of owning insurance policies than those without such experiences. Households 
with a higher number of members have a higher probability of being insured than those with 
fewer members. These influencing factors are also known to international disaster and in-
surance research. The measured risk perception of climate change showed, however, no 
significant correlation with the status of being insured or not. But we found a weak correla-
tion between not believing that climate change takes place and being insured. Respondents 
who believe that climate change does not take place, have a higher probability of not having 
bought home or accident insurance than persons who believe in climate change or who are 
                                                 
15
  see, e.g., Plapp (2004), Grothmann and Patt (2005), Kunreuther and Pauly (2005) 
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undecided yet. Overall, the goodness of fit of this logistic regression is weak and the results 
need further research (see Table 7). 
Logistic Regression 
Double-sided test: 
*** = significant at the 1%-level 
* = significant at the 10%-level 
Group 1: Holding one or more poli-
cies of home or accident  insurance(n 
= 391) 
Group 2: No such insurance (n = 119) 
Real estate owner (yes) 0.921*** 
Experience with extreme weather event (yes) 0.823*** 
Believe that climate change does not take place -0.708* 
Believe that climate change takes place  0.221 
Number of household members 0.23* 
Constant -0,087 
Pseudo-R² 0.133 
Table 7: Study A -Who tends to buy (home) insurance? 
The results of study B, however, suggest that perceived risk has a significant effect on private 
insurance demand. This could be shown by bivariate correlation analyses (Correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.30, significant at the 1%-level) and a multivariate (ordered logit) approach with the 
data of study B (Table 8). However, the regression coefficient in Table 8 is very small. 
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Ordered Logit 
Double-sided test: 
*** = significant at the 1%-level 
** = significant at the 5%-level 
Understanding of the necessity to 
insure buildings against future cli-
mate change related damages  
N = 138 
Personal Perceived Risk 0.0528 *** 
Gender: female 0.3764 
Age - 0.0017 
Children - 0.3880 
Education - 0.8521 ** 
Income 0.3263 
Home-owner 0.3082 
Agreement to statement “Climate change is biggest 
challenge for mankind” 
- 0.1265 
Interest for climate change - 0.5084 
Revealed knowledge on climate change - 0.5038 ** 
Feeling influenced by mass media 0.1074 
Stated experience of climate change impacts 0.0849 
Stated Expectation of  Public Relief in case of need 0.2726 
Pseudo-R² 0.0791 
Table 8: Study B - Factors influencing the understanding of the need to insure 
 
These results show that the theoretical (positive) relation of personal perceived risk and mo-
tivation to protect, e.g. by insurance, exists in our samples. However, other factors may play 
important roles, too. By the existing data we cannot exclude that variables not measured in 
our surveys, e.g. personal risk attitude, and prior experience with insurance policies, have a 
much greater effect on insurance demand than personal perceived risk with regard to cli-
mate change. This topic definitely deserves more and deeper research. 
7. Conclusion 
One main goal of the analysis was to check the correlations and interactions between 
knowledge about climate change and the risk perception of climate change. In study A, we 
found in fact no significant correlation between the score from the knowledge questions and 
the hazard perception, but we found a correlation with the dread-factor as the main compo-
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nent influencing risk perception of climate change. Respondents who revealed a better 
knowledge in the questions about climate change perceived the climate change impacts as 
less dreadful than those with weaker knowledge. This was confirmed in study B, where re-
spondents who revealed a better knowledge had perceived a lower degree of risk than those 
with less accurate knowledge about the effects of climate change. Respondents in study A 
who declared their own level of information about climate change as being rather high, ap-
praised climate change as a known phenomenon and ascribed to themselves a good ability 
to imagine its effects. This, however, may lead to a higher degree of risk perception of cli-
mate change. 
Strong trust in the function of external aid services in case of extreme weather events – fire-
fighters and other helpers as well as financial support – leads to decreased risk perception of 
climate change. 
Overall, both surveys independently from each other identified certain factors determining 
risk perception. These are gender, experience of extreme weather events, and actual 
knowledge about Climate Change.  
The finding of study B regarding the non-effectiveness of climate impact information should 
evoke concern about the cost and benefit of large-scale campaigns to inform the public 
about expected climatic effects. Given the broad coverage of the topic in mass media with 
partly quite drastic pictures and messages, scientifically grounded information may not en-
hance the awareness that climate change can impact everybody and that it is time to take 
action on a personal level, too. 
A significant effect of risk perception on the willingness to insure was exposed in study B, but 
not in study A. However, in study A we found a significant influence of experience with dam-
ages through extreme weather events on insurance coverage.   
Regarding the expected effects of climate change we – as a society – should be interested in 
precautionary measures of all kinds and on all institutional levels. Instead of multiple large 
scale information campaigns, other strategies, e.g. site-specific risk evaluation and commu-
nication about concrete protection measures may be more effective. Additionally, focussing 
on concrete, tangible effects of climate change such as “inundation” or “storm hazard” could 
help to ground the elusive concept of climate change. This may be a topic for further re-
search.  
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Appendix 
B1: Informative text about climate change and expected impacts in study B 
Note: In the survey, either the chapter on global impacts or on regional impacts has been 
provided to the participants. The other chapters (e.g. causes of climate change) were dis-
tributed to all treated participants. 
Global Climate Change [both subgroups] 
Current available evidence indicates that there have already been significant changes in cli-
mate and climate-related effects throughout various regions of the world. According to sci-
entific consensus, climate change is “already happening, unequivocal and this change can 
now be firmly attributed to human activity.” Over the past 100 years, the average global 
temperature has risen 0.74C, with most of the warming occurring in the past 50 years.  If 
greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase at their present rate, average global temper-
ature could rise to about 3C by the end of this century. Further warming may induce many 
changes in the global climate system during the 21st century that would very likely surpass 
those that have occurred in the previous century.  
A Definition of Climate Change [both subgroups] 
A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by 
changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extend-
ed period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether 
due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.  
Causes of Climate Change [both subgroups] 
Climate scientists concur that principal reason for the increase in temperature and related 
weather and climate events is the result of a century and a half of industrialization. Human 
activities such as the burning of oil, gasoline and coal, the increase in deforestation and cer-
tain farming methods have increased the emissions of so-called “greenhouse gases” (GHGs) 
in the atmosphere. These gases, which include carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide 
among others, have amassed in the atmosphere to a quantity that is interfering with the 
balance of the world’s climate system.  
GHGs are naturally occurring gases which affect the absorption, scattering and emission of 
radiation within the atmosphere and at the Earth’s surface. These gases are vital for mediat-
ing the temperature of the planet and thus are essential for life on earth. However, global 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon of GHGs have increased markedly since 1750 and now 
far exceed pre-industrial values. 
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The largest growth in GHG emissions between 1970 and 2004 has come from energy supply, 
transport and industry. Annual emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important anthropo-
genic GHG, have grown between 1970 and 2004 by about 80%, from 21 to 38 gigatonnes 
(Gt), and represented 77% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004.  
The clear increase in the atmospheric concentrations of these gases is augmenting global 
temperatures to artificially high levels and, as a result, altering the climate. The 1990s have 
been recorded as the warmest decade of the last millennium. Moreover it is deemed virtual-
ly certain that this trend of warmer and more frequent hot days over most land regions will 
continue within the next century. 
Predicted Global Impacts [subgroup ‘global impacts’] 
Current projections state that trends in extreme weather events, along with other risks such 
as glacier melting and sea level-rise, are already occurring at a lower level of temperature 
rise than expected and are likely to increase within the next century. Between 1990 and 
2008 almost 600,000 people died directly from more than 11,000 extreme weather events, 
and losses of 1.7 trillion USD occurred (in 2008 values). Bangladesh, Myanmar and Honduras 
have been identified to be the most affected. They are followed by Vietnam, Nicaragua, Haiti 
and India. Further examples global impacts by sector are listed below.  
Agricultural Effects: 
 Increased temperature is expected to enhance crop yields in temperate areas, 
but decrease crop yields in tropical areas, increasing the risk of hunger.  
 Changes in agricultural and forestry management at Northern Hemisphere 
latitudes are possible, such as earlier spring planting of crops and alterations 
in disturbances to forests due to fires and pests. 
 Increases in the frequency of droughts and floods are projected to affect local 
and crop production negatively especially in subsistence sectors at low lati-
tudes.  
 Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African and Latin 
American countries is projected to be severely compromised. This would fur-
ther adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition.  
 There may be an increased yield of rain-fed agriculture by 5-20 % in North 
America, but with variability among regions.  
Health Effects:  
 Predicted threats on some aspects of human health include excess heat-
related mortality in Europe and North America, changes in Infectious Disease 
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vectors in parts of Europe and an earlier onset and increases in seasonal pro-
duction of allergic pollen.  
 The changes will be mostly felt by those least able to adapt, such as the poor, 
the very young and the elderly.  
 There are projected increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases and 
injury due to extreme weather events; increased burden of diarrhoeal diseases; 
increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher concentrations 
of ground-level ozone in urban areas related to climate change; and the altered 
spatial distribution of some infectious diseases in many world regions.  
Biodiversity Effects: 
 A likely increased risk of extinction among 20-30% of plant and animal species 
is expected if global temperature increase exceeds 1.5-2.5C.  
 There is high confidence in changes in terrestrial biological systems i.e. earlier 
timing of spring events such as leaf unfolding, bird migration and egg-laying, 
as well as pole-ward and upward movement of plant and animal species.  
 Enlargement of glacial lakes, increasing ground instability in permafrost re-
gions and rock avalanches in mountain regions may cause changes in some 
Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems, including those in sea-ice biomes, and preda-
tors at high levels of the food web. 
 Gradual replacement of tropical forest by savanna in eastern Amazonia is ex-
pected to occur, as well as a risk of significant biodiversity loss through spe-
cies extinction in many areas of tropical Latin America.  
 There will be a likely reduction in the thickness and extent of glaciers, ice 
sheets and sea ice, with changes in related ecosystems and detrimental ef-
fects on many organisms.  
 Specific ecosystems and habitats are projected to be vulnerable as climatic 
barriers to species invasions are lowered in Polar Regions. 
Coastal Effects and Water Availability: 
 Coasts are projected to be exposed to increasing risks, including coastal ero-
sion and sea-level rise. Densely-populated and low-lying areas, where adap-
tive capacity is relatively low, are especially at risk. 
 Sea-level rise in small island developing states may exacerbate inundation, 
storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus threatening vital infra-
structure that supports the socio-economic well-being of island communities. 
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 Large populations in Asian Mega deltas (i.e. Genges-Brahmaputra and the 
Zhujiang) may have a high exposure to seal-level rise, storm surge and river 
flooding.  
 Increased stress on coastal communities and habitats in North America is ex-
pected as a result of climate change impacts.  
 In Europe there will be an increased risk of inland flash floods, more frequent 
coastal flooding and increased erosion, as well as glacier retreat in mountain-
ous areas. 
 By mid-century, water availability is predicted to increase by 10-40% at high 
latitudes and in some wet tropical areas, and decrease by 10-30% over some 
dry regions at mid-latitudes and in the dry tropics, some of which are present-
ly water stressed areas.  
 Water resources may be compromised in small island communities e.g. the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, to the point where they become insufficient to 
meet demand during low-rainfall periods.  
 Up to 250 million people in Africa at increased risk of water stress by 2020 
due to water shortages. 
 Freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-East Asia is predicted 
to decrease by the 2050s  
 Warming in western North American mountains is projected to cause de-
creased snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows.  
Economic effects: 
 Higher summer temperatures will lead to increased energy demand for space 
cooling in many regions. 
 Climate change may lead to increased energy related costs, coastal and storm 
damage related costs, health-related costs, etc. Economic impacts will be une-
venly distributed across regions and within the economy and society. 
 Impacts will place immense strains on public sector budgets and some sec-
ondary effects of climate impacts can include higher prices, reduced income 
and job losses. 
 Climate change has the potential to push developing countries back into the 
poverty trap and to undo many achievements that have been made to date 
with regard to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)  
 27 
 
 Reduced snow cover and winter tourism is expected in some European coun-
tries. 
 Southern Europe will face higher temperatures and drought, reduced water 
availability, hydropower potential, summer tourism and crop productivity. 
Predicted Impacts within Germany [subgroup ‘local impacts’] 
Current research shows that the annual mean temperature in Germany over the past 100 
years rose by about 0.8C and in the past decades this warming trend has increased to nearly 
double that rate at a pace of 0.15C per decade. By 2100 temperatures in Germany will be 
likely to increase with regional and seasonal differences by 1.5 to 3.7C. In the past 100 years 
precipitation has increased significantly, primarily in western Germany, with the greatest 
increase taking place in winter. Climate change is also manifesting itself in the unusual inten-
sity of extreme weather events such as heat periods and heavy precipitation. They are long-
er in duration, more frequent or more intense. There will be fewer frost days, more hot days 
and more tropical nights, and the number and duration of heat waves will increase. Studies 
show that southwest Germany (Upper Rhine Graben), the central sections of eastern Ger-
many and the Alps have the highest vulnerability to climate changes. 
Health Effects:  
 Illnesses and injuries caused by heat waves, storms, floods avalanches or landslides 
expected to increase 
 Altered areas of spread of vector-borne diseases 
 Great heat intensities in cities may lead to more cardiovascular problems and even 
deaths. 
 For the Upper Rhine Graben climate change will become manifest in particular by a 
substantial increase in hot days and nights as well as in the number and duration of 
hot seasons. This increase will be a challenge for the health care sector in particular. 
Agriculture and Forestry:  
 Impairment of crop yields particularly in regions that will be more arid in the future 
 Increase in soil erosion, mounting risk of impeded drainage, flooding or drought 
stress 
 Increased vulnerability of forests unsuitable for their location as well as greater risks 
of forest fires  
 Increasing pressure due to pests and extreme weather conditions.  
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 Above average rise in winter precipitation for the North Sea coast and the northwest 
German lowlands and a particularly sharp decrease in summer precipitation for the 
Baltic Sea coast and the north eastern lowlands. This may lead to problems in agricul-
ture or water management in the northeast regions, which have already been affect-
ed by drought. 
Water Management: 
 Summer precipitation will decline by 30 percent on average. However, the frequency 
of heavy precipitation will increase, with greater risk of floods in winter and spring 
 More frequent low water in summer and altered groundwater tables with possible 
consequences for drinking water supply 
 The highest increase in average winter precipitation in all of Germany is expected in 
the low mountain range region on both sides of the Rhine. Summer precipitation will 
decline to a relatively minor extent. Consequences can be expected for agriculture 
and forestry as well as for flood protection. 
Nature conservation and biodiversity: 
 Threat to species diversity, especially in wetlands and mountainous regions, with 
consequences for nature and conservation goals.  
Tourism: 
 We must expect a shrinkage in glaciers and snow cover in the Alps  
 Reduced snow-reliability in mountainous regions for winter tourism, though im-
proved prospects of economic success for tourist destinations on the coasts  
 Possible negative consequences for tourists because of increased occurrence of jelly-
fish and toxic algae on the coasts.  
Flood and Coastal Protection: 
 More frequent and intensive flood events place demands on flood and coastal pro-
tection facilities 
 The sea level could rise significantly by 30 cm on average, with a considerably higher 
rise in sea level expected for part of the coasts in Germany due to land subsidence 
and enlargement of the tidal range.  
Economic effects: 
 Past extreme weather effects have amounted to very high damage costs in Germany. 
The Elbe flood in 2002 caused total economic damage of €9.4 billion 
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 The hurricanes “Lothar” and “Martin” in 1999 were responsible for damage amount-
ing to over €14 billion.  
 In addition, as a consequence of the hot summer in 2003, statisticians counted over 
7,000 deaths more than in normal summers in Germany.  
Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change [both subgroups] 
Societies can respond to climate change through two processes: mitigation and adaptation. 
The standard definitions of mitigation and adaptation agreed upon by scientists are the fol-
lowing: 
Mitigation: Technological change and substitution that reduce resource inputs and emis-
sions per unit of output. Although several social, economic and technological policies would 
produce an emission reduction, with respect to Climate Change, mitigation means imple-
menting policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance sinks. 
Adaptation: Initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human sys-
tems against actual or expected climate change effects. Various types of adaptation exist, 
e.g. anticipatory and reactive, private and public, and autonomous and planned. Examples 
are raising river or coastal dikes, the substitution of more temperature-shock resistant plants 
for sensitive ones, etc. 
B2: Questions for eliciting Personal Risk Perception in study B 
How concerned are you about the issue of climate change? 
Not at all con-
cerned 
Rather not 
concerned 
Neutral Rather con-
cerned 
Strongly con-
cerned 
Don’t know 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
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To what degree do you feel/think that climate change poses a serious hazard for the group of people 
mentioned below? 
  No serious 
danger at 
all 
Rather       
no serious 
danger 
Neutral Rather 
serious 
danger 
Very seri-
ous danger 
Don’t 
know 
Myself 
 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
My children 
 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Future Generations in 
general 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
The region around 
Mannheim  
 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
The people in Germany 1 2 3 4 5 . 
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How likely do you feel/think it is that the following expected effects of climate change will have a 
personal impact on you? 
 Very un-
likely 
Rather 
unlikely 
Neutral Rather like-
ly 
Very likely Don’t 
know 
Increased flooding 
due to heavy rain-
fall  
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Increasing droughts 
 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Increasing illnesses  
 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Strong heatwaves 
 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Increasing number 
of natural disasters 
generally 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Climate-related 
refugees from for-
eign countries 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Additional costs 
due to climate- 
tax/  climate- in-
surance 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
 
When do you expect the effects of climate change to take place? 
Never In more 
than 50 
years 
Whithin the next 
50 years 
Whithin the next 
10 years 
Already tak-
ing place 
Don’t know 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
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How often do you think about the negative effects of climate change on your personal life? 
Never Rather sel-
dom 
Neutral Rather often Always Don’t know 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
 
How strongly do you agree with the following statement? „I will experience the impacts of climate 
change in my lifetime.“ 
Strongly disa-
gree 
Rather disa-
gree 
Neutral Rather agree Strongly 
agree 
Don’t know 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
 
Do you think that you personally will be noticeably affected by climate change consequences? 
No Yes Don’t 
know 
0 5 . 
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A1: Knowledge questions in study A 
  Question Answers[ correct answers are printed in bold 
Q21 
Which animals contribute sig-
nificantly to emissions of 
greenhouse gases into the at-
mosphere?  
Cattle (68.4%), dogs (4.3%), reptiles (2.5%), polar 
bears (3.9%), none (19.4%), don’t know (9.2%) 
Q22 
Which of the following factors 
are likely to contribute to cli-
mate change? 
 
Co2 –emissions (82.9%), methane – emissions 
(38.4%), deforestation (64.1%), 
hydrogen sulfide emissions (19%), the ozone hole 
(61.2%), none of those (1.6%), don’t know (2.5%) 
Q23 
What is the International Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC)?  
An international body with the task to present the 
state of research on climate change, the associated 
risks and mitigation and adaptation strategies 
(27.3%) 
A UN forum for the coordination of environmental 
and climate policy of all participating nations 
(14.7%) 
A supranational body to discuss and coordinate the 
implementation of the decisions of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (11.4%) 
A non-profit organization that provides a platform 
for trade of emission-certificates (2.4%). 
don’t know (44.3%) 
Q24 
By how much did the global 
temperature rise from the be-
ginning of the recordings in 
1860 until today?  
0,7°C (19,4%), 
 1,8°C (32.5%), 3°C (21.2%), 5°C(7,6%), don’t know 
(16.1%) 
Q25 
Politicians of many countries 
are trying to make arrange-
ments to limit climate change. 
Which global climate target do 
they intend to achieve? (In 
comparison to preindustrial 
times) 
max. 2°C warming (31.2%) 
no warming (6,9%) 
max. 1°C warming (17.1%), max. 3°C warming 
(9.8%), max. 4°C warming (3.1%), don’t know (32%) 
Q26 Which average global sea level 
rise is predicted by most cli-
Less than 2 meters (40,2%),  
none (2%), less than 5 meters (29,2%), less than 7 
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mate scientists until 2100? meters (9,6%), don’t know (19%) 
Q27 
What are likely impacts of cli-
mate change in Germany? 
more floods (76,7%), drought in eastern Germany 
(27,1%), advantages in winegrowing (9%), spread-
ing of new parasites (51,8%) 
 less precipitation in winter (21,4%), colder sum-
mers (28,8%), desertification (19,6%), no impacts 
(2,9%), don’t know (5,9%) 
Q28 
Which sector is the main source 
of CO2 in Germany 
Power plants and district heating power stations 
(20%) 
households (5,9%),  
industry - commerce - trade (43,3%), 
 traffic (26,1%), don’t know (4,7%) 
Table 9: Study A - Knowledge questions and answers. 
 
